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1. Introduction particularly scarce in the emerging economies (Honohan,Since the early 80s, the number, frequency and size of
financial crises have continued to rise. A large number of
developed, developing and in transition countries have expe-
rienced severe banking crises during the eighties and nineties
and recently the 2007/2008 global financial crisis. The interest
in the bank failure is caused by the bankruptcy substantial
costs. Actually, the consequences of a bank failure are usually
very expensive; financial losses for the fund suppliers (share-
holders, depositors, and insurers), loss of competitiveness of
the banking industry and a destabilization of the financial
system as a whole if several individual failures escalate into a
banking crisis through contagion mechanisms. The resolution
of this type of failure implies a waste of resources, which are* Corresponding author.
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The excess risk is the major cause of bank failure. It is the
result of inefficient management and control of the bank
lending activity. The information asymmetry is the cause of
two issues that can affect the level of the credit risk. The first is
an ex-ante problem called adverse selection which occurs
before the financial transaction takes place. Adverse selection
is when the lender is subject to risk from the borrower because
of the information he keeps for his own interest. The second is
an ex-post problem and also known as moral hazard. This type
of problem arises after the granting of the credit. Such problem
arises after the credit is granted as a result of the lender's
failure to observe the borrower's actions (shares) so as to
ensure the proper use of the distributed funds, which, there-
fore, affects the probability of repayment. Obviously, the level
of the information asymmetry, of the adverse selection and of
the moral hazard depends on the quantity and the quality of the
information flow circulating between the lender and the
borrower. This increase of the banking problems on a largeting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
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lators about the stability of the financial system. Supervisors
are indeed led to make room for growing internal controls and
strengthen their prudential information. This change is due to
the fact that an appropriate supervision of institutions is a pre-
condition for the understanding of their risks.
The main objective of this theoretical movement is to
analyze the behavior of banks in terms of portfolio choice,
which is risk-taking, when the regulator imposes a solvency
standard on them. The main challenge of this approach is to
provide the basics of an effective prudential regulation that
keeps the bank failure risk below a given threshold, which is
considered acceptable. Therefore, banks are thus treated as
portfolio managers operating on incomplete markets and
whose decisions are compelled by prudential regulations.
In this context, there are several studies which demonstrate
the impact of the Basel agreements on the lending behavior of
conventional banks, whereas the literature on this topic in the
Islamic banking sector is still scarce. The study of the mini-
mum capital requirements of Islamic banks is relevant due to
the principle of risk and profit sharing that could, in turn,
reduce the overall risk incurred by the bank (Pellegrina Dalla,
2007).
The Islamic banking system, mainly the investment loss
and profit sharing, foster the investor's participation in equity,
which promotes the assiduity in the investment management
and proper monitoring. Furthermore, the other Islamic finan-
cial mechanisms (such as Murabaha, Ijara and Istisna) require
the involvement of investors in the real economy; as a result,
financial transactions are fully backed by real assets. This
feature enables Islamic banks to have a clearer view on the
allocation of funds and reduce their exposure to speculative
behavior (Khediri, Charfeddine & Ben Youssef, 2015).
Siddiqui (2006) argues that equity-based Islamic contracts will
reduce adverse selection and moral hazard problems, which
thereafter, downplays the credit risk of these Islamic financial
institutions. Actually, Islamic finance requires information
symmetry and transparency in their transactions since Islam
prohibits excessive uncertainty (gharar). Moreover, gambling
(maysir) is prohibited, which means that excessive risk taking
is not allowed. Finally, Cihak and Hesse (2010) argue that
more difficult access to liquidity for Islamic banks requires
that they should be more selective so that they will not incur a
greater risk of moral hazard.
The purpose of our study is to examine and simultaneously
compare the performance of loans and deposits of Islamic and
conventional banks in relation to the funding ratio and in
different competitive conditions. In fact, we tried to identify
the role of competitive conditions regarding the relationship
between the adequacy of the equity ratio and the banking
behavior.
In the literature, there are two opposing theories regarding
the impact of competitiveness on banking behavior. The first
shows that a competitive market may increase banks' risk-
taking behavior in order to maintain their previous levels of
profit (Allen & Gale, 2004; Hellman, Mudock & Stiglitz,
2000). This risky behavior can be noticed either through therise of the credit risk in the loan portfolio or through the fall of
the capital level “buffer” or both simultaneously. These risky
policies can lead to an increased level of non-performing loans
and subsequently to a great probability of bank failure.
However, the second theory postulates that a restricted
competitiveness should encourage banks to protect their very
high “franchise values” by pursuing security policies that
contribute to the stability of the whole banking system.
Therefore, according to the paradigm of the “franchise value”,
banks limit their risk when they have pensions, i.e. when they
have market power. This theory was theoretically and empir-
ically supported in the banking literature.
The originality of our research is to apply the concept of the
market power and its impact on the relationship between the
capital regulation and the lending and deposit banking
behavior. Most of the previous studies examined the effect of
information asymmetry on the banking risk and operations in
general. Since the competitiveness conditions exert great
pressure on the choice of the banking portfolio, we contributed
to the literature by highlighting the role of competitiveness in
the banking behavior.
Our methodological approach includes, in a first stage, a
measure of the market power of Islamic and conventional
banks through the Lerner index. Actually, the use of the Lerner
index in evaluating the competitiveness of Islamic banking
conditions in the MENA and South East Asian region can be
considered as a contribution to the Islamic banking literature.
Next, we present an empirical analysis that deals with the
relationship between capitalization and banking behavior, on
the one hand, and the effect of competition on this relation-
ship, on the other hand.
Our paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the
literature review. Section 3 describes the data and the research
methodology. Section 4 contains the results and interpretations.
Section 5 includes a robustness check. Finally, Section 6 details
our conclusion.
2. Review of literature
The academic literature on banking behavior, in accordance
with the capital regulation, uses various modeling approaches
and considers the regulation of capital in terms of the level of
the required capital, the equity ratio, the required capital as a
percentage of deposits and loans and specifically of the recent
regulation based on the risk-weighted assets. In what follows,
we organize this literature depending on the basic approaches
of the banking modeling.2.1. Portfolio approachOne approach to analyze the effects of the bank capital re-
quirements is to consider banks mainly as managers of asset
portfolios. From this point of view, the main effect of any sys-
tem of capital is to adjust the capital level regarding the risk in
order to encourage banks to select the desired portfolio strategy.
The seminal work analyzing the impact of capital re-
quirements on the choice of the portfolio are those of
194 S. Louati et al. / Borsa _Istanbul Review 15-3 (2015) 192e204Kahane (1977), Koehn and Santomero (1980) and Kim and
Santomero (1988). The first two contributions consider a
portfolio selection model based on the application of the
mean-variance analysis under which the bank takes the asset
prices and the returns as data and identifies its optimal port-
folio so as to maximize the expected utility originating from
the period-end capitalization, which in turn depends on the
degree of the bank's risk aversion.
To examine the capital regulation implications on the
strength and stability, Kahane, Koehn and Santomero evalu-
ated the effect of equity requirements on the probability of
default. Tightening the capital requirement ratio is a barrier
limiting the efficiency frontiers of the banking investment
assets, hence the bank, in this case, can react by changing the
composition of its portfolio assets per unit of capital. However,
the way the optimal portfolio is adjusted depends crucially on
the coefficient of risk aversion. These authors show that a non
risk-averse bank will respond to the increase of the equity
requirements by choosing riskier assets that thereby increase
the likelihood of bank failure. Consequently, Kahane and
Koehn and Santomero indicate that the impact of the regula-
tory capital requirements on the overall stability depends on
the level of the bank risk aversion.
Kahane (1977) suggests that the regulatory capital can
reduce the overall portfolio risk if the banking portfolio asset
composition is also subject to regulations. Actually, the
regulator can reduce the excessive risk-taking in the banking
portfolio by weighting the assets with risks as indicated in the
system of Basel I. Kim and Santomero (1988) extended the
portfolio approach by analyzing the weighting system of the
risky assets.
Rochet (1992), following the same path as Koehn and
Santomero (1980) and Kim and Santomero (1988) studied
the consequences of capital regulation on the portfolio choices
of commercial banks. He concluded that if the banks' goal is
the maximization of the market value of their future profits,
capital regulation cannot prevent banks from choosing very
risky portfolios. However, if banks act as portfolio managers
(they maximize their utility), capital regulation can be effec-
tive, but only if the weights used in the calculation of the ratio
are proportional to the systematic risks of the assets. A more
advanced theoretical literature shows that banks choose their
portfolios with a maximum risk and a minimum
diversification.2.2. Incentives approachThe models of the incentives approach try to clear up the
relationship between the capital ratio and risk-taking through
the information asymmetry at several levels of the banking
business. Two agency problems may occur in the bank's
behavior towards risk (Besanko & Kanatas, 1996). First, the
problem between the former shareholders “insiders” of the
bank who maximize their well-being and the new shareholders
'outsiders' who have taken new share issuances in order to
raise the proportion of the balance sheet equity. Second, the
problem between the insiders and regulators lies in thebanking activity which consists in making investments in risky
loans through the insiders whose funding comes from deposits
and equity.
The surplus of insiders emerges from the loans and deposit
insurance, which, in case of bankruptcy, incurs all the costs.
Deposit insurance thus indirectly provides funding (deposits)
at zero interest rate. The Basel I implementation requires that
the bank raise the amount of its own funds. This means that,
for the same amount of loans, the bank needs more capital,
which reduces the surplus of insider. It is the outsiders who
compensate this loss by paying a market price of the shares
issued by the bank. In fact, if the proportion of the insiders'
holdings is reduced, then, they will have less incentives to
make greater efforts, which reduces the stock price equilib-
rium on the market (Besanko & Kanatas, 1996).
The regulators and insurers' exposure to risk would
decrease if the bank's market value rose despite the decline of
the stock prices. However, if the insiders' effort fell sharply,
the equity market value would decline and the regulators
would find themselves in front of an ailing bank. It is at this
stage that the second agency problem comes in. The regula-
tors and insurers' welfare would deteriorate if the increase in
equity ratio had to be done. We can then quite imagine that
the agreement rules would not be applied. If the bank antic-
ipates this regulators' behavior, it may not reduce its risk
taking. It therefore appears that depending on the expectations
regarding the authorities' behavior, a bank may either reduce
or raise the risk of its portfolio as well as its market value. The
increase of the capital ratio may reduce the risk associated
with some kind of an agency problem and simultaneously
strengthen that of a different type. It would be better to hold
equity depending on the characteristics of each bank (Besanko
& Kanatas, 1996).
Other models proposed in literature, which contest the
work of (Kim & Santomero, 1988; Koehn & Santomero,
1980), provide some explanations for some dynamic effects
of prudential regulation. It is therefore shown that if the
strengthening of prudential regulation effectively reduces the
banks' profit variance (and thus the bankruptcy risk), it also
causes at least two negative effects. The first one, which is
direct, is due to the decrease of the bank's profitability brought
about by the rise of the equity to asset ratio. This decline of the
banks' profitability will weigh on the growth of their balance
sheets and thus their medium and long-term growth. The
second effect, which is an indirect one, results from the
change of the banks' optimal investment policy caused by the
decline of their profitability. Therefore, these banks are
tempted to distribute a greater proportion of the profits to their
shareholders to compensate, at least partially, the decline of
their asset returns.
This profit reallocation will be at the expense of the capital
accumulation and will intensify the consequences of the first
direct effect. The taking account of these two effects in the risk
assessment of bank failure leads us to balance the optimistic
results (including those of Rochet, 1992) according to which it
would be possible to define, at least theoretically, a prudential
regulation perfectly effective.
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behaviorMost of the contemporary theorists use the traditional
banking system to explain the pattern of Islamic banks.
Aggarwal and Yousef (2000) define the Islamic financial
model as the prospect of risk and profit sharing and conclude
that this model is not widely used because of agency and
moral hazard problems.
The theoretical model of Islamic banks is different from
that of the conventional banks. Specifically, the conventional
banks' interest-based contracts are replaced, in their conven-
tional counterparts, with earnings-based contracts in which
profits and losses are shared between the Bank and the
borrower. Moreover, Islamic banks are entitled to receive de-
posits mainly in the forms of current accounts, which have no
interest but where the bank is liable to pay capital to holders at
the request, and investment accounts (savings) defined as ac-
counts that generate a return based on the rate of profit so that
the rates may be adjusted depending on the realized profit and
even on the loss that would be subsequently shared between
the Islamic Bank and investment account holders (Iqbal, Ausaf
& Khan, 1998).
However, some previous studies confirmed that Islamic
banks diverge from their theoretical models by adopting
conventional banks' strategies. In this context, Siddiqui (2006)
argues that Islamic banks' activities are based on sales in-
struments rather than on partnership. Bourkis and Nabi (2013)
find that Islamic banks are about to imitate conventional banks
and therefore, there is no difference in the behavior of both
types of banks. Ben Khediri et al. (2015) stipulate that, since
both types of banks operate in the same competitive envi-
ronment and are regulated in the same way in most countries,
they are likely to have a similar behavior and thus similar
strategies.
In the economy, Islamic banks play the same role as con-
ventional banks. They enable savers and investors to make
profits on their capital through credit allocation and funding
management. Islamic banks are therefore subject to some risk
categories, which are common with conventional banks, and
to other risks that are specific to Islamic financial institutions.
In this context, capital regulatory provides a better risk
coverage and focuses on the supervisory practices and risk
management.
Mastura, Kabir, Taufiq, and Shamsher (2014) argue that
capital management must be done in a way that ensures an
optimal combination of capital instruments. The banks are
seen as the most important institutions that provide the mar-
kets with liquidity (Diamond & Rajan, 2000). The optimal
level of the allocated banking capital should take into account
the mandatory control imposed by the regulators since the
banking sector is one of the most regulated industries in the
world. Banking regulation is primarily based on the minimum
capital requirements. Although the regulatory capital re-
quirements are defined by the ratio of the minimum re-
quirements, Berger (1995) sets out that banks must increase
the capital ratio to ensure better stability conditions.Several studies examined the relationship between capital
and risk. Different results were reached on this matter. In the
case of the US, some studies, such as those of Aggarwal and
Jacques (2001) and Jacques and Nigro (1997), found that
banks have responded to the new regulatory capital by
excessive risk taking. Rime (2001) drew the same conclusions
for the Swiss banks. Ghosh (2014) explores the relationship
between capital and risk in 57 conventional banks and 46
Islamic banks during the 1996/2011 period. The results show
that banks raise their levels of capitalization in response to a
higher risk rather than the other way round. In this context,
Mastura et al. (2014) argue that there is a significant and
positive relationship between capital adequacy ratio and
banking activity. Their study was conducted on a sample of 52
Islamic banks and 186 conventional banks in 14 countries
during the period 1999e2009.
Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) found that banks that use
loan markets (securitization) for risk management purposes
hold less capital and therefore are more profitable but, at the
same time, riskier.
Although most previous studies support the positive rela-
tionship between the bank capital and the risk-taking behavior,
other studies showed the opposite. For example, on examining
the UK banks, Alfon, Argimon, and Bascunana-Ambros
(2004) found a negative relationship between the capital and
risk during the 1998/2003 period. Moreover, Das and Ghosh
(2004) for the Indian banks and Stolz (2007) for the German
banks found the same thing. Ghosh (2014) suggests that the
lack of a consensus between these various studies could be due
to the use of different risk measures as dependent variables.
Francis and Osborne (2012) were induced by the financial
crisis to develop a better understanding of how the capital
regulations can affect the banks' behavior. Low levels of bank
capitalization have been said to be the main reason for the
decline of the credits.
However, this does not mean that the highly capitalized
banks are exempt from the insolvency risk. The “Berhad Is-
lamic Bank of Malaysia,” for example, became insolvent in
2006, although, in 2004, it had a high capitalization ratio of
31% (Chong & Liu, 2009). A high level of capital adequacy
ratio means that banks have an additional capital for further
investment. Nonetheless, if the banks are not selective in
choosing their investments and not objective in assessing risks,
they may be exposed to more risks that they cannot control.
Ismail argues that the Malaysian Islamic banks have increased
their capital ratios by reducing their lending volumes. He also
concluded that Islamic banks have reduced their risk assets to
raise their adequacy ratio in equity.
Watanabe (2004) analyzed the impact of prudential regu-
lation on the slowing credit expansion and concluded that
“credit crunch” or “capital crunch” is, by definition, due to
regulations. Capital rationing is always a subject of research
when a crisis affects the financial or economic stability at a
national or international scale. The hypothesis of capital ra-
tioning is also frequently cited with the increase of the non-
performing loan ratio, which is a possible explanation of the
loan shrinkages (Ferri & Kang, 1999).
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bank lending was debated by several studies. The recent global
financial crisis has identified this relationship by showing that
large losses on non-performing loans can lead to a loss of the
banking capital and then to a restriction of the credit supply
and, in return, the regulation community may require an in-
crease of the equity ratio (Berrospide & Edge, 2010;
Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap, & Shin, 2008; Mora & Logan,
2010; Rice & Rose, 2010).
Theoretical and empirical studies on the banking sector
showed that the credit supply has a significant impact on the
real banking activities. Van den Heuvel and Gambacorta and
Mistrulli (2004) suggest that a deficit in the funding ratio
may cause the decline of the loans provided by the bank.
Adrian and Shin (2008), state that a negative shock to capital
leads to a decrease in the credit supply, which makes banks,
adjust their balance sheet items. Peek and Rosengren (1995)
argue that credit problems may arise when bank capital is
declining, which also gives rise to difficulties in meeting the
capital requirements. They describe this scenario as a capital
crunch where the shrinkage of liabilities prompts banks to
reduce their assets. During the Asian financial crisis, the
Korean banks reduced their lending investments and raised
their investments in risk-free assets so as to meet the re-
quirements of the capital issued by regulators. Berger and
Udell (1994) consider this scenario as a supply side of the
credit rationing in which banks become unwilling to lend
because of the reductions in the credit supply and the depletion
of the bank capital.
Carlson, Shan, and Warusawitharana (2013) think that the
separation between the supply and demand is a key issue that
arises before dealing with the impact of capital on loan
growth. For example, changes in the economic environment
that affect the bank capital may probably affect the demand for
loans. The damage to the economic environment may lead to
banks losses that result in a reduction of the bank capital. The
decline of bank capital could lead to increasingly robust reg-
ulatory requirements and encourage the bank to reduce its
lending. At the same time, a change of the economic activity
can also reduce the number of borrowers seeking loans.
3. Data and research methodologyTable 1
Number of banks per country and per specification.3.1. Data presentationCountries Conventional banks Islamic banks Total
Bahrain 7 5 12
Bangladesh 5 4 9
Indonesia 5 3 8
Jordan 7 3 10
Kuwait 6 5 11
Malaysia 5 5 10
Pakistan 9 6 15
Qatar 5 2 7
Saudi Arabia 5 2 7
Turkey 6 4 10
UAE 8 5 13
Yemen 2 3 5
Total 70 47 117Depending on the region, it is clear that Islamic financial
assets are concentrated in the Middle East and Asia. A part
from Iran and Sudan, which fully support Islamic financial
systems, we find that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
countries, Bangladesh and Malaysia are the major markets
where Islamic finance is systemically important due to the
growing market share of the Islamic financial institutions
operating in these countries. Based on these data, we chose a
sample of 117 banks, 47 Islamic and 70 conventional banks
from 12 countries, namely, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Indonesia,
Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Turkey, UAE, and Yemen. The number of banks used in eachcountry and in each sector is shown in Table 1. Our study
period, which goes from 2005 to 2012, makes us take into
account the impact of the financial crisis.
The specific banking data extracted from the balance sheets
and income statements of each bank are collected from the
Bankscope database of the Van Dijk Bureau. These data are
converted into United States dollars. The database of the
Bankscope covers between 80 and 90% of the banking sys-
tems in terms of total assets.3.2. Measurement of the Lerner indexIn our paper, we chose the Lerner index as a direct measure
of competition for the reason that it emphasizes the pricing
power which can be seen in the difference between the price
and the marginal cost, therefore capturing the extent to which
a firm can raise its prices beyond its marginal cost (Berger,
Klapper, & Turk Ariss, 2009; Jimenez, Lopez, & Saurina,
2007).
The value of the Lerner index varies between 0 and 1, such
as a high Lerner value, i.e. close to 1, indicates a monopoly
situation. However, when the Lerner index tends towards 0,
the competition level is said to be very high. A Lerner
index < 0 implies a price below the marginal cost that could
occur due, for example, to a non optimal banking practice.
Algebraically, the Lerner index is measured as follows:
L¼ PCM
P
ð1Þ
With “L”, the Lerner index and “P” the output price. Due to
the limited information regarding loans and deposits, we use
total assets, which are an indicator of the banking activity, as
an output measure in the same way suggested by Shaffer
(1993) and Berg and Kim (1994). According to study of
Carbo-Valverde, Humphrey, Maudos, and Molyneux (2009)
and Ariss, 2010, the price of total assets is measured as
follows:
P¼ Total revenues ðinterest and non interest incomeÞ
Total Assets
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marginal cost cannot be directly observed, Schaeck and Cihak
(2010) estimate it by the ratio of the average costs to the total
revenues, while Leuvensteijin et al. (2011) calculate it using a
translog cost function estimated for each country of their
models.
In our approach, which is similar to that of Leuvensteijin
et al. (2011), we assume that there is a global market for Is-
lamic financial services different from that of conventional
services. Therefore, estimating the translog-cost function of
Islamic banks in each country of our sample is carried out
separately from that of conventional banks. Then, the marginal
costs obtained will be replaced in equation (1).
As a consequence, the translog cost function will have the
following form:
Ln TCit ¼ a0þ
X2
j¼1a1 lnW
j
it þ
1
2
X2
j¼1
X2
k¼1ajk lnW
k
it
þ b1 ln TAit þ
1
2
b2ðln TAitÞ2
þ
X2
j¼1b2j ln TAit lnW
j
it þ g1tT þ
1
2
g2tT
2
þ
X2
j¼1g3tT lnW
j
it þ g4tT ln TAit þ 3i ð2Þ
where TC is the total costs of bank i at time t, TA the total
assets, and Wi the prices of the production factors defined as
the following1:
W1: The price of funds which are equal to: interest ex-
penses/total deposits and short-term funding
W2: The labor and physical capital price defined as: non-
interest/fixed assets
This equation also helps us reveal the chronological
changes through a time-trend variable T. Consequently, the
trend variable is a growing cyclical tendency measured by the
annual cycle.
After estimating the cost function for each country of our
sample and separating between the Islamic and conventional
financial sector, we can now measure the marginal cost (MC)
of each bank, which is equal to the first derivative of the cost
function regarding the bank output measured here by the total
assets.
The marginal cost is then calculated as:
MCTAit ¼
vCTit
vTAit
¼

b1 þ b2 ln TAit þ
X2
j¼1b2j lnW
j
it þ g4tT
CTit
TAit
ð3Þ1 Based on the work of Hasan and Marton (2003), Soedarmon, Machrouh,
and Tarazi (2011), Sun and Chang (2011), we use a cost function with two
factor prices. We will also re-estimate the translog-cost function with-three
input prices: price of work, price of financial costs and price of physical
capital, as a robustness test for the measurement of the market power, however,
the results support the function with two-factor prices.The coefficients (b1, b2, b2j, and g4t) are obtained by esti-
mating the trans-log function of total cost.
By replacing the marginal cost obtained in Equation (1), we
can get a measure of the Lerner index with which we can
estimate the levels of banking competitiveness over time and
across various countries in our sample.3.3. Impact of the market power in the relationship
between regulation and banking behaviorIn a second step, we analyze the loan and credit behavior of
Islamic and conventional banks regarding the regulations and
the different levels of competitiveness. Since our study in-
cludes both the time and the individual dimensions, the esti-
mation method based on econometric panel data seems to be
the most appropriate. The panel estimation method helps
multiply the number of observations and study both spatial and
temporal trends. We conducted a Hausman test for each
regression to determine if it is a fixed or random effect.
Following the model of Mastura et al. (2014), our estimate
takes the following form:
Yit ¼ a0þ b1Lernerit þ b2Cit þ b3Inflationþ b4DlnGDPgrowth
ð4Þ
where Yit refers to the changes of deposits and loans of bank i
at time t. Lerner is an index of the banking competitiveness.
Cit is a vector composed of specific banking variables as
defined in Table 5. We have also included, in our regression,
two macro-economic variables, such as the inflation rate and
the change in the natural logarithm of the real GDP. The
capitalization ratio used in this study is about the year (t  1).
This is due to the fact that the banking behavior in terms of
deposits and credits in year (t) depends on the capitalization
level in year (t  1). Moreover, bank specific banking vari-
ables are delayed by one period to avoid endogeneity prob-
lems. Then, to obtain clearer and more robust results regarding
the role played by the banking competitiveness in the rela-
tionship between the capitalization level and the Banking
behavior, we followed the work of Tabak, Fazio, and Cajueiro
(2012) to decompose the Lerner index in three dummy vari-
ables reflecting three levels of competitiveness, such as:
 High  Lerner þ 0:5sLerner;
 Low  Lerner  0:5sLerner;
 Lerner  0:5sLerner  Averge  Lerner þ 0:5sLerner,3.4. Summary statisticsAccording to Fig. 1, we can point out that the CAR mean
ratio of Islamic and conventional banks is between 15% and
27%. These rates are well above the minimum capitalization
required by the Basel agreements.
The stability report of the Islamic financial service industry
(2013), indicates that Islamic banks in some GCC countries
are more stable compared to their conventional counterparts,
Fig. 1. Evolution of the capitalization ratio.
Table 3
Descriptive statistics.
Banks Conventional banks Islamic banks
Variables Moy. St.d Min. Max Moy. St.d Min. Max
D Deposit 0.147 0.222 0.863 1.745 1.1554 7.663 0.975 111.63
D Loan 0.161 0.243 0.707 1.551 2.137 19.915 0.999 276.79
CAR 17.504 7.531 0.65 89.7 19.547 17.565 70.24 173.54
Size 16.205 1.499 11.021 18.618 14.489 1.839 9.026 18.128
D equity 0.185 0.498 0.923 9.326 0.262 0.691 0.648 6.646
Liquidity 0.211 0.128 0.016 0.845 0.195 0.128 0.002 0.672
Fee income 0.993 0.028 0.79 1.093 0.969 0.161 1.199 1.582
Inflation 6.409 4.653 4.863 20.286 6.568 4.667 4.863 20.286
GDP gr 5.559 4.583 12.72 26.17 5.139 4.448 12.72 26.17
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higher than those of traditional bank. However, and according
to Fig. 1, although the mean Islamic bank capitalization is
higher, we notice a drop of the latter as soon as 2011, whereas
conventional banks increased their capital ratio. Consequently,
the chart shows that, since 2011, there has been a similarity in
the capitalization level of both banks. Our results are in line
with the work of Beck et al. (2013) and Bourkis and Nabi
(2013) who showed that although the average capitalization
ratio of Islamic banks is higher, there is no significant capi-
talization difference between both banking sectors. This result
seems to inconsistent with the idea that suggests that CAR
ratio of Islamic banks should be higher in order to reflect the
additional risks assumed by the industry due to the nature of
its investments.
The average capitalization of Islamic and conventional
banks in each country of our sample is shown in Table 2. The
nature and the economic situation of each country have an
impact on the capitalization level. With the exception of Jor-
dan, the difference in the average capitalization between the
Islamic and conventional sector of the rest of the countries in
our sample is not significant.
The descriptive statistics of the variables used in our model
are presented in Table 3. For both banking sectors, it may be
noted that the credit variation is higher than that of deposits. In
the Islamic banks, the variation superiority of the credit
compared to deposits can be explained by free investment.
Although unrestrictive investments are made up by most ofTable 2
Average capitalization level of IB and CB for each country.
Country Conventional banks Islamic banks Total
Bahrain 19.079 27.747 46.827
Bangladesh 11.229 11.713 22.736
Indonesia 16.382 13.475 29.857
Jordan 17.659 41.085 58.743
Kuwait 17.825 20.997 38.822
Malaysia 12.813 17.166 29.979
Pakistan 13.556 18.682 32.238
Qatar 16.652 20.78 37.432
Saudi Arabia 16.928 20.649 37.577
Turkey 17.453 15.332 32.785
UAE 19.893 19.677 39.569
Yemen 43.365 16.41 59.775deposits in Islamic banks, there are no clear standards on how
to deal with this account on the bank's balance sheet, for
example, if it is to record them as balance-sheet or off-
balance-sheet items.
Comparing Islamic banks to conventional banks, we notice
that the credit variation of Islamic banks is higher. This is
explained by the average capitalization level which is higher
for the Islamic banking sector. Moreover, it can be concluded,
from Table 3, that the equity change in the Islamic banks is
higher than that of the conventional ones. This can be
explained by the risk and profit sharing principle applied by
the Islamic banks through equity securities, such as Mudar-
abah and Musharakah.
4. Results and interpretations4.1. The market power of the Islamic banksIn Table 3, we display the results of the Lerner index
obtained by estimating the translog cost function for each
country. Thus, this table shows the changes in the levels of
competition in each sector of Islamic and conventional banks
operating in 12 countries in our sample during the period
2005e2012.
In the MENA zone, the competitive environment of con-
ventional banks is more dynamic than that of the Islamic ones.
The comparative analysis of the market power between Is-
lamic and conventional banks is the subject of several studies,
such as those of Petersen and Raghuram (1995), Ariss (2010),
and Weill (2011). The importance of this comparison can be
attributed to the significant impact of bank competitiveness on
economic growth and development.
Furthermore, we find that Turkey is the only country where
the Lerner index of the Islamic banking industry is low
(0.276). Our results are consistent with those of Kuran (2004)
who states that Islamic banks operating in Turkey managed in
a short time to attract a high percentage of total deposits with a
small number of branches.
Regarding the sector of conventional banks, excepting that
of Saudi Arabia, we see, from Table 4, that the MENA coun-
tries have a higher level of competitiveness than the rest of the
regions. In a study conducted in 2010 about the conditions
of the bank competitiveness of MENA countries during the
Fig. 2. Evolution of the Lerner index between 2005 and 2012.
Table 4
Descriptive statistics of the Lerner index.
Pays Banques Islamiques Banques Conventionnelles
Obs. Moy. Min. Max. Obs. Moy. Min. Max.
Bahrain 40 0.641 0.258 0.882 49 0.226 0.906 0.692
Bangladesh 22 0.826 0.536 0.990 40 0.697 0.343 0.945
Indonesia 16 0.681 0.268 0.994 40 0.918 0.876 0.949
Jordan 23 0.656 0.027 0.848 56 0.540 0.331 0.739
Kuwait 24 0.710 0.364 0.964 44 0.498 0.102 0.755
Malaysia 20 0.720 0.168 0.999 29 0.953 0.928 0.968
Pakistan 35 0.505 0.178 0.779 40 0.339 0.145 0.703
Qatar 12 0.707 0.605 0.809 40 0.496 0.0171 0.849
Arabie Saoudite 14 0.836 0.697 0.983 40 0.847 0.717 0.998
Turquie 22 0.276 0.130 0.427 44 0.254 0.122 0.518
UAE 38 0.481 0.100 0.824 63 0.475 0.248 0.749
Yemen 20 0.446 0.513 0.763 13 0.536 0.182 0.886
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found that the information asymmetry and the entry barriers
are the primary reasons for the differences in competitiveness
across countries.
However, the literature about the comparison between the
concentration in the Islamic and conventional banks is too
limited. Muhamed-Zulkhibri et al. studied the market structure
of Islamic finance in Malaysia and assessed the degree of
competition in the sector. In the same context, Ariss (2010)
analyzed the competitive conditions prevailing in the Islamic
and conventional global banking markets, and investigated the
possible differences in concentration between these markets
using a sample of banks from 13 countries for the 2000/2006
period. The results suggest that concentration of the global
Islamic market is higher than that of their conventional
counterparts.
In general, and for our entire sample, Fig. 1 shows that the
Islamic and conventional banks in our study operate in mar-
kets with very low competitive level. According to the study of
Fernandez de Guevara and Maudos, the Lerner index of the
Spanish banks varies between 18.8% and 27,132%, whereas
Carbo-Valverde et al. (2009) found an average Lerner index
ranging from 11% to 22% for the banking industry of the
European Union.
In our study, and up to the middle of 2008, we notice that
the competitive level observed in the area of conventional
banks is higher than that of the Islamic banks. This can be
consistent because in most banking industries where both
types of banks coexist, the number of Islamic banks is almost
always lower than that of conventional banks. This reflects
the embryonic phase of Islamic banking in our sample. From
the end of 2008, the values of the Lerner index of both
banking industries have become closer to each other.
Nevertheless, the study rejects the hypothesis that Islamic
banks have a greater market power and therefore a greater
ability to influence the prices. Our hypothesis is based on the
fact that the customers of Islamic banks have religious moti-
vations, i.e., they are less sensitive to prices, making the de-
mand more inelastic than in conventional banks. Two possible
explanations are given for this result (Fig. 2).Although Islamic banks are looked at as businesses with the
goal of making profits, these profits must respect and be in line
with their specific values. Moreover, some obligations that
limit their activities, such as the principle of permissible in-
vestment (Hallel), the prohibition of speculation and the need
to establish a fair price, can contribute to the minimization of
their market power.
Furthermore, a second explanation is reflected through the
principle of sharing losses and profits. According to this
principle, an Islamic bank depositor can be considered as a
shareholder in the way that he does not receive a fixed interest
rate but shares the bank's profits and losses. Therefore, higher
profits from the services offered and billed to the depositors
imply that the latter are expected to pay higher prices paid. As
a result, these depositors have incentives to limit the prices of
the financial services of the Islamic banks for themselves.4.2. Estimation resultsIn Table 5, we present the results of our model in order to
analyze the impact of the market power of the Islamic and
conventional banks on the relationship between the regulations
and the banking behavior in terms of deposits and loans. In this
context, Mastura et al. (2014) suggest that capital requirements
have a significant impact on the behavior of loans and deposits
of 52 Islamic banks and 186 conventional banks belonging to
14 different countries over the period 1999e2009. Their results
show that capitalization is positively related to the deposit and
loan variations of both Islamic and conventional banking
sectors.
According to columns [1], [5], [9] and [13], there is a
significant and negative relationship between the Lerner index
of conventional banks and the deposit and loan variations.
Since this indicator is inversely related to competitiveness, our
results state that rising competition leads to an increase in
deposits and loans. However, regarding Islamic banks,
competitiveness has a significant effect only on the credit
variation. Unlike in conventional banks, the Lerner index and
Credit D are negatively related. We can deduce that Islamic
banks are less sensitive to market conditions than their con-
ventional counterparts which behave as risk takers in front of
increased competitiveness. Our results are inconsistent with
Table 5
Results of the estimation model.
Conventional banks Islamic banks
D Deposit D Loan D Deposit D Loan
Lerner 0.191***
(0.000)
0.181***
(0.000)
0.182***
(0.000)
0.191***
(0.000)
0.195***
(0.000)
0.223***
(0.000)
0.179***
(0.000)
0.227***
(0.000)
0.471
(0.690)
0.006
(0.997)
0.503
(0.680)
1.561
(0.394)
33.18**
(0.023)
36.168**
(0.030)
31.078**
(0.045)
36.431**
(0.042)
CAR (1) 0.006***
(0.006)
0.006**
(0.015)
0.005**
(0.014)
0.006**
(0.018)
0.005*
(0.064)
0.005**
(0.038)
0.004*
(0.064)
0.006**
(0.022)
0.009
(0.701)
0.0005
(0.986)
0.0112
(0.668)
0.009
(0.699)
0.733**
(0.010)
0.796***
(0.008)
0.748**
(0.014)
0.794***
(0.009)
High.comp*CAR 0.002
(0.427)
0.003**
(0.049)
0.016
(0.612)
0.088
(0.669)
Averg.comp*CAR 0.006
(0.561)
0.003**
(0.010)
0.018
(0.322)
0.119
(0.289)
Low.comp*CAR 0.001
(0.798)
0.002
(0.196)
0.086
(0.142)
0.124
(0.749)
Size (1) 0.075**
(0.029)
0.079**
(0.022)
0.079**
(0.023)
0.079**
(0.023)
0.126***
(0.001)
0.122***
(0.001)
0.123***
(0.001)
0.123***
(0.001)
0.577***
(0.005)
0.598***
(0.006)
0.647***
(0.003)
0.603***
(0.005)
1.1795
(0.808)
1.5474
(0.761)
1.5352
(0.762)
1.7131
(0.737)
D equity 0.054***
(0.001)
0.052***
(0.001)
0.052***
(0.001)
0.057***
(0.001)
0.069***
(0.000)
0.069***
(0.000)
0.071***
(0.000)
0.073***
(0.000)
0.538
(0.278)
0.578
(0.260)
0.594
(0.243)
0.473
(0.344)
24.60***
(0.000)
24.57***
(0.000)
26.04***
(0.000)
24.86***
(0.000)
Liquidity (1) 1.035***
(0.000)
1.079***
(0.000)
1.071***
(0.000)
1.060***
(0.000)
0.5285***
(0.001)
0.5169***
(0.001)
0.57***
(0.000)
0.51***
(0.002)
5.037*
(0.055)
4.944*
(0.073)
5.611**
(0.044)
5.268*
(0.055)
15.918
(0.486)
18.680
(0.458)
15.808
(0.529)
18.851
(0.454)
Fee income (1) 1.097
(0.183)
1.085
(0.186)
1.071
(0.192)
1.095
(0.183)
1.302
(0.153)
1.390
(0.122)
1.315
(0.142)
1.437
(0.112)
1.0627
(0.722)
1.1164
(0.716)
1.1243
(0.713)
1.1574
(0.704)
0.3034
(0.990)
1.323
(0.956)
3.9568
(0.870)
0.41684
(0.986)
Inflation 0.009***
(0.000)
0.008***
(0.000)
0.009***
(0.000)
0.009***
(0.000)
0.012***
(0.000)
0.013***
(0.000)
0.012***
(0.000)
0.012***
(0.000)
0.008
(0.895)
0.015
(0.830)
0.008
(0.910)
0.007
(0.920)
0.773*
(0.085)
0.698
(0.137)
0.655
(0.167)
0.7243
(0.120)
GDP 0.012***
(0.000)
0.012***
(0.000)
0.012***
(0.000)
0.012***
(0.000)
0.014***
(0.000)
0.014***
(0.000)
0.015***
(0.000)
0.013***
(0.000)
0.009
(0.876)
0.011
(0.856)
0.013
(0.825)
0.011
(0.848)
0.179
(0.662)
0.158
(0.706)
0.218
(0.601)
0.172
(0.681)
Constant 2.5403**
(0.011)
2.616***
(0.009)
2.590**
(0.010)
2.607***
(0.009)
3.478***
(0.002)
3.488***
(0.001)
3.474***
(0.001)
3.563***
(0.001)
8.774*
(0.061)
9.394*
(0.057)
10.003**
(0.040)
10.684**
(0.031)
52.36
(0.517)
60.63
(0.474)
61.37
(0.467)
66.10
(0.440)
Hausman 0.0000 0.0000 0.0124 0.0073 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9047 0.9520 0.9436 0.9391 0.0049 0.0166 0.0101 0.0025
R2 0.3677 0.3754 0.3747 0.3596 0.3841 0.4054 0.4108 0.3742 0.412 0.732 0.381 0.567 0.548 0.687 0.472 0.614
*, **, *** Respectively significant to 10%, 5% and 1%. The coefficient is indicated by the digits displayed above. The probability is put between brackets.
Notes: D Deposit, D Loan, CAR, High.comp*CAR, Averg.comp*CAR, Low.comp*CAR, Size, D equity, Liquidity, Fee income, Inflation, GDP refer to change in deposits, change in loans, capital adequacy ratio
(using risk-weighted assets), interactive terms, size (ln total assets), change in equity, liquidity ratio (liquid assets/total assets), Fee income (non-interest operating income/net interest revenue þ other operating
income), inflation rate, change in real GDP.
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banks differ in their theoretical model but the behavior of Is-
lamic and conventional banks is the same.
Kim, Lee, and Park (2002) studied the capitalization effect
on the behavior of the banking loans through the assumption
of capital rationing, which they defined as a lack of liquidity in
the market due to the restriction of the banking credits to meet
their capital requirements. By looking at Table 5, we can say
that the deposits and loans of Islamic and conventional banks
positively react to the evolution of the funding ratio. The
significant and positive CAR coefficients compared to Deposit
D and Credit D prove that banking loans react the same way as
the capital increase, which confirms the theory of supply ac-
cording to which the credit behavior is particularly influenced
by the level of bank capitalization. The significant and positive
coefficient of the deposit change suggests that the increase in
deposits is influenced by the changes in the CAR ratio. This
result means that the bank capital is mainly made up of de-
posits. Our results are consistent with those of Peek and
Rosengren (1995), Chiuri, Ferri, and Majnoni (2002),
Yudistira (2002), and Schmitz (2007).
The coefficients of the interactions between the levels of
competitiveness and the RAC ratio are significant only in the
case of Credit D of conventional banks. For the conventional
banking sector, the increase of the funding level is positively
linked to the credit changes only when the level of banking
competitiveness is high. However, concerning the medium and
low level of competition, an increase in the CAR is followed
by a shrinking of the credit supply. This result is relevant to the
banking regulations since a minimum increase in the
requirement ratio, in a highly competitive condition, can make
banks take more risk to achieve higher returns.
We have also introduced, in our estimation, other control
variables that can affect the behavior of the Islamic and con-
ventional bank loans. The results of columns [1] and [5] show
that, for the conventional banking sector, there is a significant
negative relationship between the bank size, as measured by
the natural logarithm of the total assets, and the change in the
deposits and credits of conventional banks.
Our results are consistent with those of Peek and Rosengren
(1995), Schmitz (2007); Kunt and Huizinga (2011) and Mas-
tura who concluded that the increase of deposits and loans is
lower for larger banks. However, for Islamic banks, the size is
significantly negative for the deposit change but positive for
that of the credits.
It can be concluded that the funding of Islamic banking is
not based on deposits. The positive and significant sign be-
tween the size and Credit D of Islamic banks confirms the
results of Cihak and Hesse (2010) who expect the major Is-
lamic banks to be riskier and less stable. This can also be
explained by the hypothesis of “too big to fail” according to
which highly capitalized large Islamic banks can engage in an
excessive risk-taking behavior. For both banks, the positive
and significant coefficient of equity D suggests that the credit
activities are in line with equity increase.
It is proven, through variable liquidity as measured by the
ratio of the liquid assets to total assets, that the behavior ofIslamic banks is influenced by the level of capitalization and
not by that of liquidity. The liquidity negative sign compared
to Deposit D for both types of banks, indicates that banks
prefer liquidity to deposits in order to meet the required
capitalization level. The variable “Fee income”, which is used
in our regression to examine the impact of the off-balance-
sheet earnings on the banking behavior, does not appear to
be significant throughout the model.
If we take into account, in our results, the effect of the
macro-economic conditions in each country, we integrate two
control variables, namely, the real GDP changes and inflation.
Goodhart, Hofmann, and Segoviano (2004) show that bank
loans are considered to be a pro-cyclical behavior that could
be correlated with economic activities. The real GDP D pos-
itive sign means that economic growth plays a role in the in-
crease of the supply and demand for bank loans. During the
economic growth downturns, banks will be exposed to a
slowdown in loan growth due to low interest rates and capi-
talization constraints. The second macro-economic variable
used in our model is the monetary policy, as measured by the
rate of inflation. High inflation is usually caused by an
excessive money supply on the market as well as by decline of
the interest rates Revell (1979) suggests that the impact of
inflation on the changes of loans and deposits depends on the
anticipation and the quick reaction of the bank in relation to
the inflation rate. Under conditions of a good anticipation,
banks will adjust the prices and the interest rates to compen-
sate for the declining purchasing power. At the same time,
depositors will reduce their savings. Therefore, a positive
relationship is expected between the inflation rate and the
credit change and a negative relationship with deposit change.
However, the Islamic banking behavior, unlike that of con-
ventional banks, is no longer affected by both the GDP
changes and the inflation rate, which suggests that Islamic
banks are less vulnerable to any changes in the macro-
economic situation.
5. Robusteness check
To assess the robustness of our results, we used a second
measure of competitiveness other than the Lerner index. At
this stage, the results are presented in Table 6 by using HHI as
an alternative measure of banking competition.
In a study about bank risk-taking behavior applied to Is-
lamic banks in the MENA region, Srairi (2013) shows that the
concentration of the banking market is negatively related to
risk. His results are consistent with those of Sullivan and
Spong, according to which banks operating in a concentrated
market and benefiting from a higher franchise value deductible
are less prompted to take risk.
According to Table 6, HHI has a significant impact only on
the loan and deposit behavior of conventional banks. The
positive and significant sign between HHI and D Deposit, Loan
D indicates that a concentration increase is followed by an
increase of the deposit and loan variation in conventional
banks. However Islamic banks' behavior shows a complete
independence from the market competitiveness conditions.
Table 6
The HerfindhaleHirschman index (HHI).
Conventional banks Islamic banks
D Deposit D Loan D Deposit D Loan
HHI 1.029 (0.008) 2.274 (0.000) 1.934 (0.394) 4.315 (0.571)
CAR (1) 0.009 (0.000) 0.011 (0.000) 0.112 (0.000) 0.050 (0.535)
HHI*CAR 0.044 (0.000) 0.054 (0.000) 0.091 (0.444) 0.125 (0.467)
Size (1) 0.025 (0.483) 0.038 (0.338) 0.546 (0.016) 2.447 (0.001)
D equity 0.058 (0.000) 0.079 (0.000) 0.164 (0.856) 1.55 (0.610)
Liquidity (1) 0.939 (0.000) 0.344 (0.030) 3.644 (0.191) 15.739 (0.092)
Fee income (1) 1.341 (0.091) 1.767 (0.041) 1.640 (0.609) 1.805 (0.867)
Inflation 0.010 (0.000) 0.014 (0.000) 0.013 (0.857) 0.354 (0.151)
GDP 0.012 (0.000) 0.014 (0.000) 0.013 (0.829) 0.076 (0.724)
Constant 1.736 (0.083) 1.966 (0.072) 5.801 (0.237) 41.799 (0.011)
Hausman 0.0000 0.0000 0.3117 0.9244
R2 0.3660 0.4276 0.4262 0.3841
202 S. Louati et al. / Borsa _Istanbul Review 15-3 (2015) 192e204Since competitiveness in the banking market primarily affects
the interest rate, it can be concluded that Islamic banks are
about to apply their theoretical model based essentially on the
prohibition of interest. Moreover, it can be deduced from Table
6 that IHH can be a moderating variable of the banking
relationship-capitalization behavior only in conventional banks.
6. Conclusion
The recent global financial crisis has increased the interest
of the banking regulations to identify the relationship be-
tween the leverage effect, the market structure and the bank
size (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010). Is-
lamic finance is an ethical banking system based on the
principle of risk and profit sharing. Theoretically, this prin-
ciple should reduce the risk incurred by the Islamic bank.
However, the problems of the market imperfections, such as
the information asymmetry, can be a barrier for the trans-
formation of this theory into a reality. These problems can
make leaders react in an inadequate way, which could affect
the strength, the stability and the efficiency of the bank. In
this context, the objective of this chapter is to study the
impact of the capitalization ratio on the loan and deposit
change of the Islamic banks compared with their conventional
counterparts. To meet this goal, we have chosen a sample of
70 conventional banks and 47 Islamic banks belonging to 12
different countries where both types of banks coexist during
the period 2005e2012. Taking into account both the indi-
vidual and time effect, our methodology is based on the panel
econometrics.
Our results show that capital regulatory requirements have
a significant impact on the credit behavior of the Islamic and
conventional banks. However, the deposit change for the Is-
lamic banks is no longer affected by the level of the capital
adequacy. This could be explained by the fact that Islamic
banks are based on assets and not on deposits to meet the
regulatory requirements. Moreover, and through the in-
teractions between the different levels of competitiveness and
the ratio of capitalization, we were able to conclude that themarket power of the Islamic banks, unlike that of the con-
ventional banks, has no significant effect on the relationship
between the capitalization level and the banking behavior,
which means that the operating Islamic banks of our sample
are applying their theoretical model based on the prohibition
of interest. This result shows that Islamic banks are less sen-
sitive to the conditions of the market competitiveness. More-
over, it turned out that the behavior of Islamic banks is
independent from the level of the market competitiveness and
therefore from the interest rate. Hence, both banking sectors
have different behavior showing that Islamic banks are
applying their theoretical models.
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